

# Configure Wireshark and FreeRADIUS in order to decrypt 802.11 WPA2-Enterprise/EAP/dot1x over-the-air Wireless Sniffer

## Contents

[Introduction](#)

[Prerequisites](#)

[Requirements](#)

[Components Used](#)

[Background Information](#)

[Procedure](#)

[Step 1. Decrypt PMK\(s\) from Access-accept Packet.](#)

[Step 2. Extract PMK\(s\).](#)

[Step 3. Decrypt the OTA Sniffer.](#)

[Example of a Decrypted 802.11 Packet](#)

[Example of an Encrypted 802.11 Packet](#)

[Related Information](#)

## Introduction

This document describes a how-to of decrypting Wi-Fi Protected Access 2 - Enterprise (WPA2-Enterprise) or 802.1x (dot1x) encrypted wireless over-the-air (OTA) sniffer, with any Extensible Authentication Protocol (EAP) methods.

It is relatively easy to decrypt PSK based/WPA2-personal 802.11 OTA capture as long as the full four-way EAP over LAN (EAPoL) handshakes are captured. However, Pre-shared Key (PSK) is not always recommended from a security perspective. Cracking a hard-coded password is just a matter of time.

Hence, many enterprises choose dot1x with Remote Authentication Dial-In User Service (RADIUS) as a better security solution for their wireless network.

## Prerequisites

## Requirements

Cisco recommends that you have knowledge of these topics:

- FreeRADIUS with **radsniff** installed
- Wireshark/Omnipeek or any software that is capable of decrypting 802.11 wireless traffic
- Privilege to obtain the shared secret between network access server (NAS) and

## Authenticator

- Ability to capture radius packet capture between NAS and authenticator from the first access-request (from NAS to Authenticator) to the last access-accept (from Authenticator to NAS) throughout the EAP session
- Ability to perform Over-the-Air (OTA) capture containing four-way EAPoL handshakes

## Components Used

The information in this document is based on these software and hardware versions:

- Radius server (FreeRADIUS or ISE)
- Over-the-Air capture device
- Apple macOS/OS X or Linux device

The information in this document was created from the devices in a specific lab environment. All of the devices used in this document started with a cleared (default) configuration. If your network is live, ensure that you understand the potential impact of any command.

## Background Information

In this example, two Pairwise Master Keys (PMKs) are derived from Radius packets captured from ISE 2.3, as the session timeout on this SSID is 1800 secs, and the capture given here is 34 mins (2040 secs) long.

As shown in the image, EAP-PEAP is used as an example, but this can be applied to any dot1x based wireless authentication.

No.	Time	Source	Destination	Protocol	Length	Info
4325	2018-11-16 00:04:02.812197	Cisco_b4:3d:e4	HmdGloba_6a:69:11	EAP	109	Request, TLS EAP (EAP-TLS)
4327	2018-11-16 00:04:02.812927	HmdGloba_6a:69:11	Cisco_b4:3d:e4	EAP	73	Response, Legacy Nak (Response Only)
4329	2018-11-16 00:04:02.816752	Cisco_b4:3d:e4	HmdGloba_6a:69:11	EAP	109	Request, Protected EAP (EAP-PEAP)
4332	2018-11-16 00:04:02.818331	HmdGloba_6a:69:11	Cisco_b4:3d:e4	TLSv1.2	244	Client Hello
4349	2018-11-16 00:04:02.828460	Cisco_b4:3d:e4	HmdGloba_6a:69:11	TLSv1.2	1079	Server Hello, Certificate, Server Key Exchange, Server Hello Done
4352	2018-11-16 00:04:02.829281	HmdGloba_6a:69:11	Cisco_b4:3d:e4	EAP	73	Response, Protected EAP (EAP-PEAP)
4354	2018-11-16 00:04:02.833165	Cisco_b4:3d:e4	HmdGloba_6a:69:11	TLSv1.2	1075	Server Hello, Certificate, Server Key Exchange, Server Hello Done
4356	2018-11-16 00:04:02.834110	HmdGloba_6a:69:11	Cisco_b4:3d:e4	EAP	73	Response, Protected EAP (EAP-PEAP)
4361	2018-11-16 00:04:02.839052	Cisco_b4:3d:e4	HmdGloba_6a:69:11	TLSv1.2	738	Server Hello, Certificate, Server Key Exchange, Server Hello Done
4363	2018-11-16 00:04:02.845092	HmdGloba_6a:69:11	Cisco_b4:3d:e4	TLSv1.2	199	Client Key Exchange, Change Cipher Spec, Encrypted Handshake Message
4365	2018-11-16 00:04:02.851843	Cisco_b4:3d:e4	HmdGloba_6a:69:11	TLSv1.2	124	Change Cipher Spec, Encrypted Handshake Message
4367	2018-11-16 00:04:02.853063	HmdGloba_6a:69:11	Cisco_b4:3d:e4	EAP	73	Response, Protected EAP (EAP-PEAP)

No.	Time	Source	Destination	Protocol	Length	Info
9095	2018-11-16 00:34:07.507960	Cisco_b4:3d:e4	HmdGloba_6a:69:11	TLSv1.2	754	Encrypted Handshake Message, Encrypted Handshake Message, Encrypted Handshake Message
9095	2018-11-16 00:34:07.519109	HmdGloba_6a:69:11	Cisco_b4:3d:e4	TLSv1.2	215	Encrypted Handshake Message, Change Cipher Spec, Encrypted Handshake Message
9095	2018-11-16 00:34:07.524344	Cisco_b4:3d:e4	HmdGloba_6a:69:11	TLSv1.2	140	Change Cipher Spec, Encrypted Handshake Message
9095	2018-11-16 00:34:07.525423	HmdGloba_6a:69:11	Cisco_b4:3d:e4	EAP	89	Response, Protected EAP (EAP-PEAP)
9095	2018-11-16 00:34:07.528660	Cisco_b4:3d:e4	HmdGloba_6a:69:11	TLSv1.2	125	Application Data
9095	2018-11-16 00:34:07.529567	HmdGloba_6a:69:11	Cisco_b4:3d:e4	TLSv1.2	129	Application Data
9095	2018-11-16 00:34:07.532409	Cisco_b4:3d:e4	HmdGloba_6a:69:11	TLSv1.2	151	Application Data
9095	2018-11-16 00:34:07.536570	HmdGloba_6a:69:11	Cisco_b4:3d:e4	TLSv1.2	183	Application Data
9095	2018-11-16 00:34:07.569469	Cisco_b4:3d:e4	HmdGloba_6a:69:11	TLSv1.2	169	Application Data
9095	2018-11-16 00:34:07.570964	HmdGloba_6a:69:11	Cisco_b4:3d:e4	TLSv1.2	124	Application Data
9095	2018-11-16 00:34:07.574596	Cisco_b4:3d:e4	HmdGloba_6a:69:11	TLSv1.2	125	Application Data
9095	2018-11-16 00:34:07.575693	HmdGloba_6a:69:11	Cisco_b4:3d:e4	EAP	89	Response, Protected EAP (EAP-PEAP)

## Procedure

### Step 1. Decrypt PMK(s) from Access-accept Packet.

Run the **radsniff** against radius capture between NAS and Authenticator in order to extract PMK. The reason why two access-accept packets are extracted during the capture is that the session timeout timer is set to 30 mins on this particular SSID and the capture is 34 mins long.



counted as a scale of seconds. However, if the **radsniff** is stuck in this state shown in the log, please cascade this packet capture (A) with another longer packet capture (B) between the same NAS and Authenticator. Then, run the radsniff command against the cascaded packet (A+B). The only requirement of packet capture (B) is that you are able to run the radsniff command against it and see verbose result.


```
FRLU-M-51X5:pcaps frlu$ radsniff -I /Users/frlu/Downloads/radius_novlan.pcap -s Cisco123 -x
```

```
Logging all events
```

```
Sniffing on (/Users/frlu/Downloads/radius_novlan.pcap)
```

In this example, the Wireless Lan Controller (WLC) control plane logging (A) that is captured via [WLC packet logging](#) feature, is cascaded with a longer capture from ISE's TCPdump (B). WLC packet logging is used as an example because it is usually very small in size.

### WLC packet logging (A)

 radius_novlan.pcap	Pcap N...apture	22 KB	Today at 11:56 am
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### ISE Tcpdump (B)

 radius_eap_decode_Cisco123.pcap	Yesterday at 12:04 pm	850 KB	Pcap N...apture
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### Merged (A+B)

 radius_novlan_merged.pcapng	Pcapn...Capture	927 KB	Today at 12:28 pm
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Then run the **radsniff** against the merged pcap (A+B) and you will be able to see the verbose output.

```
FRLU-M-51X5:pcaps frlu$ radsniff -I /Users/frlu/Downloads/radius_novlan_merged.pcapng -s  
<shared-secret between NAS and Authenticator> -x
```

```
<snip>
```

```
2018-11-16 11:39:01.230000 (24) Access-Accept Id 172  
/Users/frlu/Downloads/radius_novlan_merged.pcapng:10.66.79.42:32771 <- 10.66.79.36:1812 +0.000  
+0.000
```

```
<snip>
```

## Step 2. Extract PMK(s).

Delete of 0x field in each **MS-MPPE-Recv-Key** from the verbose output and the PMKs that is needed for the wireless traffic decode is then presented.

```
MS-MPPE-Recv-Key =  
0xddb0b09a7d6980515825950b5929d02f236799f3e8a87f163c8ca41a066d8b3b
```

```
PMK :  
ddb0b09a7d6980515825950b5929d02f236799f3e8a87f163c8ca41a066d8b3b
```


```
MS-MPPE-Recv-Key =  
0x7cce47eb82f48d8c0a91089ef7168a9b45f3d798448816a3793c5a4dfb1cfb0e
```

PMK :


7cce47eb82f48d8c0a91089ef7168a9b45f3d798448816a3793c5a4dfb1cfb0e

### Step 3. Decrypt the OTA Sniffer.

Navigate to **Wireshark > Preferences > Protocols > IEEE 802.11**. Then tick on **Enable Decryption** and click on the **Edit** button next to **Decryption Keys**, as shown in the image.



Next, please select **wpa-psk** as the Key type, and put the PMKs derived in the **Key** field, and then click on **OK**. After this is completed, the OTA capture should be decrypted and you are able to see higher layer (3+) information.





## Example of a Decrypted 802.11 Packet

The screenshot shows a Wireshark capture of a network interface. Packet 397886 is selected and highlighted in red. The packet details pane shows the following structure:

- Frame 397886: 154 bytes on wire (1232 bits), 154 bytes captured (1232 bits)
- Radiotap Header v0, Length 48
- 802.11 radio information
- IEEE 802.11 QoS Data, Flags: .p.....TC
- Logical-Link Control
- Internet Protocol Version 4, Src: 172.16.255.13, Dst: 40.127.66.24
- Transmission Control Protocol, Src Port: 45658, Dst Port: 80, Seq: 128, Ack: 4001196, Len: 0

The packet bytes pane shows the raw data of the packet, with the first few bytes highlighted in blue.

If you compare the second result where the PMK is not included, with the first result, where the PMK is included, packet 397886 is decrypted as 802.11 QoS data.

## Example of an Encrypted 802.11 Packet

The screenshot shows a Wireshark capture of a network interface. Packet 397886 is selected and highlighted in red. The packet details pane shows the following structure:

- Frame 397886: 154 bytes on wire (1232 bits), 154 bytes captured (1232 bits)
- Radiotap Header v0, Length 48
- 802.11 radio information
- IEEE 802.11 QoS Data, Flags: .p.....TC
- Data (68 bytes)

The packet bytes pane shows the raw data of the packet, with the first few bytes highlighted in blue.

**Caution:** You may encounter issue with Wireshark on decryption, and in that case, even if the right PMK is provided, (or if PSK is used, both SSID and PSK are provided), Wireshark does not decrypt the OTA capture. The workaround is to turn Wireshark off and on a few times until higher layer information can be obtained and 802.11 packets are no longer shown as QoS data, or to use another PC/Mac where Wireshark is installed.

**Tip:** A C++ code called pmkXtract is attached in the first post in Related Information. Attempts to compile were successful and an executable file is obtained, but the executable program does not seem to perform the decryption properly for some unknown reasons. In addition, a Python script that attempts to extract PMK is posted in the comment area on the first post, which can be further explored if readers are interested.

## Related Information

- [Tweaking EAP's weak link – sucking WiFi PMKs out of RADIUS with pmkXtract](#)
- [How to Decode Radius MS-MPPE-Recv-Key](#)
- [Technical Support & Documentation - Cisco Systems](#)